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Abstract:  A  Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN) is a collection of low-power and 
lightweight wireless sensor nodes that are used to monitor the human body functions and 
the  surrounding  environment.  It  supports  a  number  of  innovative  and  interesting 
applications, including ubiquitous healthcare and Consumer Electronics (CE) applications. 
Since WBAN nodes are used to collect sensitive (life-critical) information and may operate 
in  hostile  environments,  they  require  strict  security  mechanisms  to  prevent  malicious 
interaction with the system. In this paper, we first highlight major security requirements 
and  Denial  of  Service  (DoS)  attacks  in  WBAN  at  Physical,  Medium  Access  Control 
(MAC),  Network,  and  Transport  layers.  Then  we  discuss  the  IEEE  802.15.4  security 
framework and identify the security vulnerabilities and major attacks in the context of 
WBAN. Different types of attacks on the Contention Access Period (CAP) and Contention 
Free Period (CFP) parts of the superframe are analyzed and discussed. It is observed that a 
smart attacker can successfully corrupt an increasing number of GTS slots in the CFP 
period and can considerably affect the Quality of Service (QoS) in WBAN (since most of 
the  data  is  carried  in  CFP  period).  As  we  increase  the  number  of  smart  attackers  the 
corrupted GTS slots are eventually increased, which prevents the legitimate nodes to utilize 
the bandwidth efficiently. This means that the direct adaptation of IEEE 802.15.4 security 
framework for WBAN is not totally secure for certain WBAN applications. New solutions 
are required to integrate high level security in WBAN. 
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1. Introduction 
A  Wireless  Body  Area  Network  (WBAN)  allows  the  integration  of  intelligent,  miniaturized,  
low-power  sensor  nodes  in,  on,  or  around  a  human  body  to  monitor  body  functions  and  the 
surrounding environment. It has great potential to revolutionize the future of healthcare technology and 
has attracted a number of researchers both from the academia and industry in the past few years. 
WBANs support a wide range of medical and Consumer Electronics (CE) applications. For example, 
WBANs provide remote health monitoring of patients for a long period of time without any restriction 
on  his/her  normal  activities  [1,2].  Different  nodes  such  as  Electrocardiogram  (ECG), 
Electromyography (EMG), and Electroencephalography (EEG) are deployed on the human body to 
collect the physiological parameters and forward them to a remote medical server for further analysis 
as given in Figure 1. Generally WBAN consists of in-body and on-body area networks. An in-body 
area  network  allows  communication  between  invasive/implanted  devices  and  a  base  station.  An  
on-body  area  network,  on  the  other  hand,  allows  communication  between  non-invasive/wearable 
devices and a base station.  
Figure 1. WBAN architecture for medical applications. 
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The  consideration  of  WBANs  for  medical  and  non-medical  applications  must  satisfy  stringent 
security and privacy requirements. These requirements are based on different applications ranging 
from medical (heart monitoring) to non-medical (listening to MP4) applications [3]. In case of medical 
applications, the security threats may lead a patient to a dangerous condition, and sometimes to death. 
Thus,  a  strict  and  scalable  security  mechanism  is  required  to  prevent  malicious  interaction  with 
WBAN. A secure WBAN should include confidentiality and privacy, integrity and authentication, key 
establishment  and  trust  set-up,  secure  group  management  and  data  aggregation.  However,  the 
integration of a high-level security mechanism in a low-power and resource-constrained sensor node 
increases the computational, communication and management costs. In WBANs, both security and 
system performance are equally important, and thus, designing a low-power and secure WBAN system 
is a fundamental challenge to the designers. In this paper, we present a brief discussion on the major 
security  requirements  and  threats  in  WBANs  at  the  Physical,  Medium  Access  Control  (MAC), 
Network,  and  Transport  layers.  We  analyze  the  performance  of  IEEE  802.15.4  [4,5]  security 
framework  for  WBAN  using  extensive  simulations.  Different  types  of  attack  on  IEEE  802.15.4 
superframe are considered in the simulations. The results are presented for smart, random, and weak 
attackers in  terms of probability of failed Guaranteed  Time  Slots (GTS) requests (due to backoff 
manipulation attacks) in the Contention Access Period (CAP) period, number of corrupted slots in the 
Contention Free Period (CFP) period, and decrease in bandwidth utilization. It is concluded that smart 
attackers can successfully disrupt the entire communication channel in the network.  
The rest of the paper is categorized into six sections. Section 2 and Section 3 outline the major 
security issues and threats in WBAN. Section 4 describes the IEEE 802.15.4 security framework for 
WBAN.  In  Section  5,  we  identify  possible  attacks  on  the  IEEE  802.15.4  superframe  structure.  
Section 6 presents simulation results. The final section concludes our work. 
2. Security Issues and Requirements  
A WBAN is a special type of network which shares some characteristics with traditional WSNs but 
differs  in  many  others  such  as  strict  security  and  low-power  consumption.  It  is  mandatory  to 
understand the type of WBAN applications before the integration of a suitable security mechanism. 
The  correct  understanding  will lead  us  towards  a  strong  security  mechanism  that  will  protect  the 
system from possible threats. The key security requirements in WBANs are discussed below. 
2.1. Data Confidentiality 
Like WSNs, Data confidentiality is considered to be the most important issue in WBANs. It is 
required to protect the data from disclosure. WBANs should not leak patient’s vital information to 
external or neighbouring networks. In medical applications, the nodes collect and forward sensitive 
data to the coordinator. An adversary can eavesdrop on the communication, and can overhear the 
critical information. This eavesdropping may cause severe damage to the patient since the adversary 
can use the acquired data for many illegal purposes. The standard approach to protect the data secure is 
to encrypt it with a secure key that can only be decrypted by the intended receivers. The use of 
symmetric key encryption is the most reliable for WBANs since public-key cryptography is too costly 
for the energy-constraint sensor nodes.  Sensors 2011, 11                         
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2.2. Data Integrity 
Keeping the data confidential does not protect it from external modifications. An adversary can 
always alter the data by adding some fragments or by manipulating the data within a packet. This 
packet can later be forwarded to the coordinator. Lack of data integrity mechanism is sometimes very 
dangerous especially in case of life-critical events (when emergency data is altered). Data loss can also 
occur due to bad communication environment.  
 
2.3. Data Authentication 
 
It confirms the identity of the original source node. Apart from modifying the data packets, the 
adversary can also change a packet stream by integrating fabricated packets. The coordinator must 
have the capability to verify the original source of data. Data authentication can be achieved using a 
Message Authentication Code (MAC) (to differentiate it from Medium Access Control (MAC), the 
Message Authentication Code (MAC) is represented by bold letters) that is generally computed from 
the shared secret key.  
 
2.4. Data Freshness 
 
The adversary may sometimes capture data in transit and replay them later using the old key in 
order to confuse the coordinator. Data freshness implies that the data is fresh and that no one can 
replay old messages. There are two types of data freshness: weak freshness, which guarantees partial 
data frames ordering but does not guarantee delay, and strong freshness, which guarantees data frames 
ordering as well as delay.  
2.5. Secure Localization 
Most  WBAN  applications  require  accurate  estimation  of  the  patient’s  location.  Lack  of  smart 
tracking mechanisms allow an attacker to send incorrect reports about the patient’s location either by 
reporting false signal strengths or by using replaying signals.  
2.6. Availability 
Availability implies efficient availability of patient’s information to the physician. The adversary 
may  target  the  availability  of  WBAN  by  capturing  or  disabling  a  particular  node,  which  may 
sometimes result in loss of life. One of the best ways is to switch the operation of a node that has been 
attacked to another node in the network.  
2.7. Secure Management 
Secure  management  is  required  at the  coordinator  to  provide  key  distribution  to the  nodes  for 
encryption and decryption operation. In case of association and disassociation, the coordinator adds or 
removes the nodes in a secure manner.  
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3. Possible Security Threats and Attacks 
A WBAN is vulnerable to a considerable number of key attacks. These attacks are conducted in 
different ways, i.e., Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, privacy violation, and physical attacks. Due to 
restrictions on the power consumption of the sensor nodes, protection against these types of attacks is a 
challenging task. A powerful sensor can easily jam a sensor node and can prevent it from collecting 
patient’s data on regular basis.  
Attacks on WBAN can be classified into three main categories [6]: (a) attacks on secrecy and 
authentication,  where  an  adversary  performs  eavesdropping,  packet  replay  attacks,  or  spoofing  of 
packets, (b) attacks on service integrity, where the network is forced to accept false information [7], 
and (c) attacks on network availability (DoS attacks), where the attacker tries to reduce the network’s 
capacity. In the following section, we briefly present most important DoS attacks at physical, data link, 
network, and transport layers. A brief summary of these attacks is given in Table 1 [8].  
 
Table 1. WBAN OSI layers and DoS attacks/denfeses. 
Layers  DoS Attacks  Defenses 
Physical 
Jamming 
Spread-spectrum, priority messages, lower duty cycle, region 
mapping, mode change 
Tampering  Tamper-proof, hiding 
Link 
Collision  Error correcting code 
Unfairness  Small frames 
Exhaustion  Rate limitation 
Network 
Neglect and greed  Redundancy, probing 
Homing  Encryption 
Misdirection  Egress filtering, authorization monitoring 
Black holes  Authorization, monitoring, redundancy 
Transport 
Flooding  Client Puzzles 
De-synchronization  Authentication 
 
3.1. Physical Layer Attacks 
 
Some of the main responsibilities of physical layer include frequency selection and generation, 
signal  detection,  modulation,  and  encryption  [9].  Since  the  medium  is  radio-based,  jamming  the 
network is always possible. The most common attacks are jamming and tampering. Jamming refers to 
interference with the radio frequencies of the nodes. The jamming source can be powerful enough to 
disrupt the entire network. Tampering refers to the physical attacks on the sensor nodes [10]. However, 
nodes in WBAN are deployed in close proximity to the human body, and this reduces the chances of 
physical tampering. 
 
3.2. Data Link Layer Attacks 
 
This layer is responsible for multiplexing, frame detection, channel access, and reliability. Attacks 
on this layer include creating collision, unfairness in allocation, and resource exhaustion. Collision Sensors 2011, 11                         
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occurs when two or more nodes attempt to transmit at the same time. An adversary may strategically 
create extra collisions by sending repeated messages on the channel. Unfairness degrades the network 
performance by interrupting the MAC priority schemes. Exhaustion of battery resources may occur 
when a self-sacrificing node always keeps the channel busy.  
 
3.3. Network Layer Attacks 
 
The nodes in WBAN are not required to route the packets to other nodes. Routing is possible when 
multiple WBANs communicate with each other through their coordinators. Possible attacks include 
spoofing, selective forwarding, sybil, and hello flood. In spoofing, the attacker targets the routing 
information and alters it to disrupt the network. In selective forwarding, the attacker forwards selective 
messages and drops the others [11]. In sybil, the attacker represents more than one identity in the 
network [12]. The hello flood attacks are used to fool the network, i.e., the sender is within the radio 
range of the receiver.  
 
3.4. Transport Layer Attacks 
 
The attacks on the transport layer are flooding and de-synchronisation. In flooding, the attacker 
repeatedly  places  requests  for  connection  until  the  required  resources  are  exhausted  or  reach  a 
maximum limit. In de-synchronisation, the attacker forges messages between nodes causing them to 
request the transmission of missing frames.  
4. IEEE 802.15.4 Security for WBAN 
IEEE 802.15.4 is a low-power standard designed for low data rate applications. It offers three 
operational frequency bands: 868 MHz, 915 MHz, and 2.4 GHz bands. There are 27 sub-channels 
allocated in IEEE 802.15.4, i.e., 16 sub-channels in 2.4 GHz band, 10 sub-channels in 915 MHz band 
and  one  sub-channel  in  the  868  MHz  band.  IEEE  802.15.4  MAC  has  two  operational  modes:  a  
beacon-enabled mode and a non-beacon enabled mode. In the beacon-enabled mode, the network is 
controlled  by  a  coordinator,  which  regularly  transmits  beacons  for  device  synchronization  and 
association control. The channel is bounded by a superframe structure as illustrated in Figure 2.  
Figure 2. IEEE 802.15.4 superframe structure.
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The  superframe  consists  of  both  active  and  inactive  periods.  The  active  period  contains  three 
components: a beacon, a Contention Access Period (CAP), and a Contention Free Period (CFP). The 
coordinator interacts with nodes during the active period and sleeps during inactive period. There are 
maximum of seven GTS slots in the CFP period to support time critical traffic. In the beacon-enabled 
mode, a slotted CSMA/CA protocol is used in the CAP period. In the non-beacon enabled mode, the 
channel is accessed using unslotted CSMA/CA protocol.  
The main security requirements presented in the IEEE 802.15.4 standard specification are access 
control, confidentiality, frame integrity, and sequential freshness. Access control ensures the protection 
of frames from unauthorized nodes. Confidentiality makes sure that only legitimate nodes share the 
secret information. Frame integrity protects the frames from manipulation by an adversary. Sequential 
freshness confirms the freshness of the frames.  
The  IEEE  802.15.4  security  layer is  handled at the  MAC layer. The security requirements are 
specified at the application layer by tuning some control parameters. If no parameters are selected, no 
security  mechanism  is  used.  The  specification  defines  four  packet  types:  beacon,  data, 
acknowledgement, and control packets. The beacon packets are used for synchronization and resource 
allocation. No security information can be included in the acknowledgement packets. In others, the 
information  such as integrity  protection  and confidentiality  protection  can  be integrated  whenever 
required. The IEEE 802.15.4 specification has a choice of security suites that control different security 
levels. Each security suite has different security properties, protection levels, and frame formats. The 
IEEE  802.15.4  based  security  suites  can  be  considered  for  WBAN  with  necessary  modifications.  
Table 2 lists different security suites defined in the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [13]. They are broadly 
classified  into  null,  encryption  only  (AES-CTR),  authentication  only  (AES-CBC-MAC),  and 
encryption and authentication (AES-CCM) suites. In AES-CTR, confidentiality protection is provided 
using Advance Encryption Standard (AES) block cipher [14] with counter mode. In AES-CBC-MAC, 
security including integrating protection is provided using CBC-MAC [15]. The AES-CCM provides 
high-level security that includes both data integrity and encryption. Details about these security suites 
are presented in the standard.  
 
Table 2. Security modes in IEEE 802.15.4. 
Name  Description 
Access 
Control 
Confidentiality 
Frame 
Integrity 
Sequential 
Freshness 
Null  No security         
AES-CTR  Encryption only, CTR Mode  X  X    X 
AES-CBC-MAC-128  128 bit MAC  X    X   
AES-CBC-MAC-64  64 bit MAC  X    X   
AES-CBC-MAC-32  32 bit MAC  X    X   
AES-CCM-128  Encryption & 128 bit MAC  X  X  X  X 
AES-CCM-64  Encryption & 64 bit MAC  X  X  X  X 
AES-CCM-32  Encryption & 32 bit MAC  X  X  X  X 
 
The IEEE 802.15.4 is considered very close to WBAN due to its quick implementation, reliable 
security mechanism, and support of low data rate applications with low cost of power consumption. A Sensors 2011, 11                         
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significant  improvement  has  been  seen  in  the  IEEE  802.15.4  in  terms  of  superframe  variation 
(expanding  the  CFP  period)  and  contention  access  mechanisms  [16,17].  Since  contention  access 
mechanisms are not reliable for WBAN due to Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) and heavy collision 
problems, researchers have urged to shrink the CAP period in the IEEE 802.15.4 superframe and 
subsequently extend the CFP period [18]. The purpose was to carry loads of packets in the CFP part of 
the superframe. As discussed earlier, the IEEE 802.15.4 specification defines seven GTS slots for 
collision free transmission. A node interested to grab the slot tracks the beacon for resource allocation. 
The coordinator decides the assignment of the GTS slot. If needed, more than one GTS slot can be 
allocated to a node. Figure 3(a,b) shows the GTS allocation and deallocation process defined in the 
IEEE 802.15.4 specification.  
 
Figure 3. (a) GTS allocation process, (b) GTS deallocation process. 
 
(a)              (b) 
 
First, the nodes receive the beacons to identify the superframe boundaries. A GTS request is sent in 
the  CAP  part  of  the  superframe  to  the  coordinator.  The  request  includes  the  required  length  and 
direction (uplink or downlink) of the GTS slot. The coordinator may send an acknowledgement packet 
to confirm the successful reception of the GTS request. If GTS slots are available, the coordinator 
assigns them to the nodes using the beacon frame. Once assigned, the data transmission takes place in 
the GTS slots of the following superframes. 
The GTS allocation process may frequently occur in case of WBAN, where many nodes request the 
allocation of GTS slots. The main disadvantage of the IEEE 802.15.4 is the number of GTS slots is 
limited to seven. In WBAN, nodes generally require more GTS slots in the CFP period. This can be 
achieved by the varying the CFP duration according the applications. No matter how many GTS slots 
are present in the CFP period, they have a vulnerable point that allows an attacker to disrupt the 
communication  between  nodes  and  the  coordinator.  Another  problem  is  that  the  adversary  may 
continuously select a small backoff window and may contend with the legitimate nodes (in the CAP 
period) in order to protect them from sending the GTS request packets. The following section briefly 
describes possible attacks on the CAP and CFP periods.  
 
5. Attacks on the CAP and CFP Periods 
Since most the traffic in WBAN is carried in the CFP period of the superframe, attacks on both 
CAP  (this  is  used  for  resource  allocation  in  CFP)  and  CFP  periods  can  disrupt  the  entire 
communication between nodes and the coordinator. To attack the CAP period (also called backoff 
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manipulation attack), a selfish node or an attacker attempts to select a small backoff window in order 
to keep the channel busy all the time. This attack prevents the legitimate nodes to send GTS slot 
requests  to  the  coordinator  as  given  in  Figure  4(a).  The  backoff  manipulation  attack  was  first 
investigated for IEEE 802.11 networks in [19], where a selfish user implemented a whole range of 
strategies to maximize its access to the medium. Most of the challenging task is to detect backoff 
manipulation attacks [20,21]. Because the backoff counter is selected on random basis, it is very hard 
to identify the adversary who has deliberately chosen a small backoff window. A scheme to detect 
backoff manipulation attack is presented in [21], which works well for adversaries who are unaware of 
the detection scheme. But a smart adversary can efficiently maximize his throughput and can minimize 
the chances of his detection [22]. Another method of detecting these attacks is proposed in [23] where 
the receiver is used to assign backoff windows to the sender but the problem is that receiver cannot 
always be trusted.  
Figure 4. (a) Backoff manipulation attack on the CAP, (b) Attack on CFP period. 
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request  to  the  coordinator.  The  attacker  waits  for  the  following  beacon  to  extract  the  GTS  slot 
information. Once the coordinator approves the GTS request, it integrates the slot information into the 
beacon frame. Both the legitimate node and the adversary receive the beacon. After obtaining the GTS 
slot information, the adversary can easily create interference in the GTS slot. Since the GTS slots are 
used to carry critical data (life-critical in case of WBANs [25]), interference in transmission affects the 
QoS requirements.  
6. Evaluation and Results 
We simulate a number of attacks on the CAP and CFP periods of the IEEE 802.15.4 superframe using 
the NS 2.31 simulator [26]. The simulation is based on the framework defined in [24]. We consider a 
network of ten legitimate nodes, which can be randomly attacked by five attackers. The attackers are 
categorized into smart, random, and weak attacks. Smart attackers aim at corrupting both the CAP and 
CFP periods. They corrupt the GTS slot with maximum duration. Random attackers aim at corrupting 
CFP period only with an average GTS slot duration. Weak attackers aim at corrupting GTS slots with 
minimum duration. The attacks are triggered at random basis in each simulation run and the results are 
analyzed in terms of probability of failed GTS requests (due to backoff manipulation attacks) in the CAP 
period, number of corrupted slots in the CFP period, and decrease in bandwidth utilization.  
The smart attackers repeatedly attempt to access the channel in the CAP period, thus increasing the 
probability of failed GTS requests, as given in Figure 5. It can be seen that few smart attackers can 
disrupt the entire communication channel. Since the original data transmission in WBAN takes place 
in the CFP period, analysis of attacks on the CFP period is becoming increasingly important.  
Figure 5. Probability of failed GTS requests. 
 
Figure  6  shows  the  total  number  of  corrupted  slots  in  the  CFP  period  for  a  number  of  smart 
attackers. The figure shows that two smart attackers can successfully corrupt up to 149 GTS slots. This 
trend increases up to 1,912 GTS slots for 30 smart attackers. Once the GTS slots are identified and 
attacked, the attackers try to decrease the bandwidth utilization in each slot. Corrupting more GTS 
slots result in the lowest bandwidth utilization. This corruption depends on the type of attacks. A smart 
attacker can corrupt more slots than a random or weak attacker. This is shown in Figure 7, where two 
smart attackers corrupt more slots and therefore decrease the bandwidth utilization by 71%. These are Sensors 2011, 11                         
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the best results in the attacker’s point of view (and worst for the legitimate nodes). Two random 
attackers and one weak attacker decrease the bandwidth utilization by 49% and 15%, respectively. The 
later is the worst case for the attackers. As IEEE 802.15.4 networks may not frequently utilize the CFP 
period, the GTS attacks are not a big threat to them. But the direct adaptation of IEEE 802.15.4 
security framework for WBAN is not reliable as most of the data is carried in the CFP period of  
the superframe.  
Figure 6. Total number of corrupted slots in the CFP. 
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7. Conclusions 
Starting from the WBAN security requirements at different layers, we studied the IEEE 802.15.4 
security  framework  for  WBANs  and  identified  different  types  of  attacks  on  the  IEEE  802.15.4 
superframe by a number of adversaries. These attacks were categorized into smart, random, and weak 
attacks.  Simulation  results  showed  that  the  smart  attacker(s)  has  the  capability  of  corrupting  an 
increasing number of GTS slots compared to random and weak attackers. This means that the direct 
adaption of IEEE 802.15.4 security framework for WBANs is not reliable since most of the traffic in 
WBANs is carried in CFP period, which is most vulnerable to GTS attacks.  Sensors 2011, 11                         
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One  of  the  solutions  is  to  implement  a  sophisticated  backoff  detection  scheme  that  should 
successfully detect the backoff attacks. However, the backoff detection scheme may not work for 
adversaries who have enough knowledge of the scheme. They may try to maximize their throughput 
and  minimize  their  chances  of  detection.  Another  approach  is  to  allow  the  receiver  to  assign  the 
backoff window to the sender. In this scheme, the receiver can easily detect any attack and can even 
penalize the adversaries by increasing their backoff values. A game theoretic approach could also be 
useful to detect and prevent the attacks by considering that all nodes are selfish.  
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